



**Director
Central
Intelligence**

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Prospects for Anti-US Terrorism

**Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
Memorandum to Holders**

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MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS

NI IIM 82-10002

PROSPECTS FOR ANTI-US TERRORISM

Information available as of 31 October 1984 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.

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SCOPE NOTE

This Memorandum to Holders is the second update of NI IIM 82-10002, *Prospects for Anti-US Terrorism*, issued 26 March 1982. Last year's update reviewed significant anti-US terrorist developments from the time of the issuance of this Interagency Intelligence Memorandum through the middle of 1983. In this second update we examine anti-US terrorism through September 1984 and suggest what level and kind of terrorism Americans are likely to experience in various regions of the world over the next year or so.

In our discussion of anti-US terrorism within the United States, we include only those incidents that involve acts against Americans undertaken or sponsored by non-US citizens or entities.

Note: This Memorandum to Holders was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Council. It was coordinated with the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps.

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KEY JUDGMENTS

Two events in 1983—the suicide vehicle bombings of the US Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut—caused more casualties (271 dead and 116 wounded) than the United States had suffered from terrorists in the previous 15 years combined. However, the number of significant terrorist attacks Americans abroad experienced last year (about 75) was almost identical to the number that occurred in both 1982 and 1981.

As compared with 1983, the rate of significant terrorist attacks against US targets has risen in 1984—to 64 incidents in the first nine months—and geographic trends have changed. The most notable of these 1984 attacks was the vehicle bombing of the US Embassy Annex in East Beirut in September. The number of attacks rose fairly sharply in the Middle East in 1983, and the rate climbed even further in the first nine months of 1984. In Western Europe, however, the number of attacks dropped in 1983 as compared with 1982, and it remained down in the first three quarters of 1984. Changes have also taken place in Central America, where the number of attacks against Americans has dropped in the last 12 months, and in South America, where they have increased. While US casualties worldwide so far in 1984 have been lower than in 1983, American losses this year are higher than those experienced in most prior years.

Activities of Groups and Responses by Governments

The increase in terrorism against US interests in the Middle East, most of which occurred before the withdrawal of the US Marines from Lebanon, was a predictable response by various opponents of US Lebanon policy. This increase was facilitated by the breakdown of local security in Beirut, the large number of Americans present until the Multinational Force departed in March 1984, and the existence of a number of Iranian-backed radical Shia groups committed to eliminating US influence in Lebanon and driving out all Americans. Palestinian groups have been active against other nationalities, but, with the major exception of the Abu Nidal Group (also known as the Black June Organization), a non-PLO organization largely controlled by Syria, they did not attack US interests either in the Middle East or elsewhere.

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The campaign against INF deployments did not take on the violent orientation that we predicted in last year's Memorandum to Holders, a circumstance that probably contributed to a lower number of terrorist attacks against US personnel and property in Western Europe than we had anticipated. In addition, West European governments have been even more successful in countering terrorists than we had estimated they would be.

In general, the terrorists in Western Europe most active against US interests continue to be those small, autonomous organizations interested primarily in scoring propaganda victories with homemade bombs. One worrisome development, however, is that such hardcore, dedicated terrorist groups as the Red Army Faction (RAF) in West Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy, and the Revolutionary Organization of 17 November in Greece (which killed CIA Station Chief Richard Welch in 1975) have shown new signs of life: the Red Brigades claimed credit for assassinating an American official of an international organization in February 1984; seven members of the RAF were recently arrested with detailed casing reports of various NATO and US installations in their possession; and the 17 November group attacked two US military officials in the last year. The problem in Greece is particularly serious, largely because the Greek Government, unlike virtually all other governments in Western Europe, has shown little perseverance or skill in countering international terrorism on its territory.

State Support for Terrorism

The roster of those governments that, directly or indirectly, use terrorism as a foreign policy tool remains unchanged. Iran, Syria, and Libya head the list. Iranian involvement with international terrorism is of particular concern because it has risen dramatically in the last two years. The most prominent Iranian-backed attacks against Americans were the three vehicle bombing episodes in Beirut.

Syria almost certainly backed some terrorist attacks against Americans while the US Marines were in Beirut. It also assisted and probably instigated three or four bombing attacks by the Abu Nidal Group against US diplomatic facilities in Amman, Jordan, in 1984. Libya's terrorist activity surged in 1984, along with Qadhafi's rhetoric against the United States. No Libyan terrorist attacks against Americans took place in 1983—or so far in 1984—however, probably because Libyan assets were generally employed in a wave of attacks against Libyan dissidents abroad, and because Qadhafi may fear the US retaliation if he goes after Americans. Tripoli did encourage non-Libyan groups to attack US targets in Chad and Sudan, but none were successful.

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The attitudes and activities of the USSR, the East European states, Cuba, and Nicaragua with regard to revolutionary violence and terrorism have remained unchanged. That is, their governments continue to provide regimes and groups that use terrorist tactics with funds, weapons, supplies, and training. Their anti-American rhetoric also helps stir sentiment against the United States, which helps create a fertile environment for anti-US terrorism in such areas as the Middle East.

Anti-US Terrorist Threats in the Period Ahead

Looking at the prospects for anti-US terrorism over the next year, as detailed in the paragraphs that follow, we conclude that the number of attacks likely to be directed against Americans will remain at about the same overall level as that experienced in 1981-83. Our confidence in this judgment is not high, however, because terrorism trends are difficult to forecast. There are a number of dangerous terrorist actors intent on attacking US targets. Their success in doing so, however, will depend on several currently unknowable future developments: changes in the extent of US exposure and vulnerability, political developments in regions with serious terrorist threats, changes in perceptions of US policies, and ups and downs in local security practices.

Middle East. The most dangerous area for Americans is likely to remain the Middle East because of the fanaticism, intensity of anti-American feelings, and willingness of many of the terrorists to accept high personal risk. The main such threat will continue to come from Iranian-backed groups, such as the Hizballah in Lebanon and the Dawa Party in the Persian Gulf. The United States will continue to be at greatest risk in Lebanon, but its interests in the Persian Gulf face a gradually growing danger from local Shias trained or inspired by Iran.

Syria will remain willing to use terrorist violence as a tool of state policy, but we believe it will not encourage attacks on American targets in Lebanon as long as leaders in Damascus believe Syria's national interests are protected in whatever political arrangements evolve there. Moreover, some evidence suggests Syria has imposed constraints on Iranian-backed terrorism in Lebanon that would threaten Damascus's ability to control events in that country. Syria, however, may direct its surrogates to attack targets in Jordan, including US facilities, especially after Amman's renewal of diplomatic relations with Egypt.

A potential threat against Americans from radical Palestinian groups within the PLO continues to exist, but it may not be as high as we have assumed in the past. The 1974 ban by the PLO against terrorist attacks on non-Israeli targets generally is holding. The non-PLO 15 May

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Organization, however, may pose a threat in the next year. Despite Iraqi Government efforts to control its activities, it still has plans to place bombs on commercial airliners flying to Israel. With respect to Libya, we will probably continue to receive alarming reports about Libyan intentions during the next year, but the main direct Libyan terrorist threat is likely to remain focused on anti-Qadhafi exiles. Tripoli's efforts to encourage anti-US attacks by non-Libyan groups, however, remain a matter of concern.

Western Europe. The most frequently experienced terrorist threat the United States will face over the next year in Western Europe will almost certainly continue to be the bombing of property for propaganda purposes. We do not foresee, however, any significant rise in the number of such attacks in the next year. US personnel are in danger from occasional armed attacks by such hardcore groups as the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF) in France, the 17 November group in Greece, the Red Brigades in Italy, and the RAF in West Germany. These groups, however, seem to be capable of only a few attacks each year, and the RAF is under enough government pressure that it may not be able to regroup until early next year. We expect that strong government efforts to suppress terrorism will continue in most of Western Europe, with the notable exception of Greece.

Latin America. A sharp rise in the level of terrorism against US interests in Central America is not likely to occur, because most guerrilla groups are concentrating their resources on insurgency, and local security forces are developing increasing competence. Nonetheless, the situations in Honduras and El Salvador bear watching. There are a large number of official Americans in Honduras who make tempting targets. In addition, some dissident guerrilla factions in El Salvador may turn to urban terrorism in an effort to undermine recently announced guerrilla-government talks.

In South America, terrorist attacks against US targets could increase in the next year, particularly in Colombia and Peru. In those countries, narcotics traffickers are incensed at US efforts to persuade the government to crack down on drug activities, and local terrorists/insurgents increasingly are targeting US installations.

In the United States. The number of successful foreign terrorist attacks in the United States remains relatively low compared with those in other regions of the world, and we see little reason for it to rise over the next year or so. Nonetheless, the United States continues to be vulnerable to terrorist operations because of its porous borders and open society. Potential terrorist support networks are in place, and a number of groups have the motivation to commit terrorist acts here, either

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because they intensely oppose US foreign policy or hate particular ethnic groups resident in the United States.

Of greatest concern are the large number of Iranian students, particularly those who are members of the Islamic Society, a student group with chapters throughout the country that could provide the infrastructure for terrorist acts. Libyan students are also present in the United States in large numbers and, under the right circumstances, could represent a terrorist threat. Both Iran and Libya are more likely to attack the United States abroad rather than here because attacks elsewhere probably are easier. But developments in the Middle East, such as a perception by Qadhafi that the existence of his regime was threatened by the United States, could cause a change in this calculation.

With regard to separatist/irredentist ethnic groups, the major Armenian terrorist groups—the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG)—present the greatest danger. The threat from ASALA is diminished, however, because its ranks are fragmented, and the JCAG so far has attacked only Turkish interests.

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DISCUSSION

Developments of the Past 15 Months

Events in 1983 and First Three Quarters of 1984

1 The most dramatic contrast between terrorism in 1983 and that in all previous years is the number of terrorist-caused casualties sustained by Americans last year. By yearend, 271 US citizens had been killed and 116 wounded, figures vastly exceeding the combined totals for the previous 15 years. All but 15 of these 1983 victims (four killed, 11 wounded) were caused by two vehicle bombs set off in Beirut, Lebanon—the 18 April attack on the US Embassy and the 23 October assault on the Marine barracks. Both suicide attacks were carried out almost certainly by radical Lebanese Shias, operating with Iranian support and encouragement from Syrian-controlled territory.

2 Except for these two suicide attacks, however, the kind and number of significant¹ terrorist attacks worldwide against Americans in 1983 were very similar to what was experienced in the two preceding years. There were about 75 significant attacks against US citizens or their property last year, a number almost identical to those in 1981 and 1982. In each of these years, as indicated in table 1, there have been a small number of assassination attempts (usually fewer than 10), a small number of kidnappings (again, under 10), and a relatively large number of incendiary or explosive bombing attacks.

3 The rate at which terrorist attacks against Americans are now occurring is up in the first nine months of 1984 as compared with recent years, as we indicated might happen in last year's Memorandum. In this period, there have been 64 attacks against Americans, including five assassination attempts and 10 kidnapping incidents. Armed attacks are running double the number experienced in 1983, while significant bombings are happening at about the same rate. Ten Americans

¹ The category "significant" includes all attacks that cause—or were clearly intended to cause—casualties, plus hijackings, kidnappings, barricade situations when hostages are taken, major sabotage, terrorist robberies, and explosive and incendiary bombings that could cause \$10,000 worth of damage or more. Excluded are threats and hoaxes, minor bombings and vandalism, and conspiracies to commit an attack.

Refining Terrorism Statistics

The statistics used for the years 1981-83 in this Memorandum to Holders differ substantially from those used for these years in last year's Memorandum, although the changes do not seriously affect the trends reported there. All of the modifications stem from revised coding procedures for deciding whether a terrorist incident is significant. The overall effect of the changes is to lower the number of events in 1981, 1982, and 1983 that are considered "significant." The changes are as follows:

- Last year we included in the count of "significant" bombings (damage of \$10,000 or more) those for which there was damage but the monetary loss was unknown. Those have now been *removed* from the count in the belief that, if the amount of damage is unknown, it is more likely to have been minor rather than major. This causes about a 40-percent drop in significant incidents for 1981 and 1982, and a much smaller drop in 1983 when the new coding criteria went into effect.
- We have also *dropped* from each year skyjackings that were clearly criminal acts of extortion, the work of mentally deranged persons, or attempts to find rapid transportation across national boundaries that would otherwise be closed. Eliminating such events with no larger political purpose cuts sharply the number of terrorist skyjackings for each of the three past years.
- We have *added* to the count of significant terrorist acts for each year barricade incidents when hostages were taken, large-scale sabotage when carried out by a terrorist group, and major thefts (for example, of weapons) by terrorist groups. This change added very few events.
- We have *added* to the count for the first half of 1984 a few *unsuccessful* bombings or armed attacks that were clearly intended to cause casualties. We cannot add them to the count for earlier years, because this intent variable was not previously coded.

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Table 1
Significant Anti-US Terrorist
Incidents, 1981-84: Major Types ^a

	Number of Incidents ^b			
	1981	1982	1983	Jan-Sep 1984
Armed attacks	16	9	10	16
Kidnapings	7	8	9	10
Hijackings	8	1	1	3
Incendiary or explosive bombings ^c	40	54	48	29
Assassination attempts (also included in armed attacks and bombings above)	15	7	8	5
Sabotage	1			6

^a See inset on page 9 for explanation of differences from last year's categories.

^b Because data may not be complete, all numbers are approximate.

^c Intended to cause casualties or resulting in damage worth \$10,000 or more.

This table is Confidential

have been killed by terrorists in the first nine months this year, and 27 have been wounded.²

4. One recent shift of interest in the geographic pattern of terrorism against Americans is a rise in significant attacks in the Middle East and a drop in Western Europe. (See table 2.) In the Middle East significant attacks jumped from four in 1982 to 14 in 1983, and 13 have already occurred in the first nine months of 1984. This region also remains the most lethal for Americans—75 percent of US casualties in 1984 have occurred there. In Western Europe, however, significant attacks—most of which were propaganda-style bombings intended to cause major property damage but not cause injury—declined from 43 in 1982 to 26 in 1983, about the same number as in 1981. The rate dropped even further in 1984, with only seven such attacks recorded in the first nine months. Changes in the amount of terrorism against Americans have also taken place in Central America, where the number of attacks declined in the last 12 months, and in South America, where they have increased, especially against US private-sector facilities and persons. (See table 3.)

² Attacks against French interests worldwide, but particularly in the Middle East, have risen even more sharply. The French have suffered 69 significant attacks in the first three quarters of 1984, as compared with only 24 in all of 1983.

Table 2
Significant Anti-US Terrorist
Incidents, 1981-84: Selected Locales

	Number of Incidents ^a			
	1981	1982	1983	Jan-Sep 1984
West Germany	10	24	11	2
Italy	2	7	2	2
Greece	2	4	2	1
France	3	4	6	1
Turkey	4	2	1	
Spain			3	1
Lebanon	2	3	9	10
Jordan			2	3
Kuwait			3	
Honduras	3	5	1	
El Salvador	9		3	2
Guatemala	8	4	1	1
Colombia	3	1	12	12
Peru	9		2	5
Chile			2	6
Sudan			1	3

^a Because data may not be complete, all numbers are approximate.

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Table 3
Types of US Targets Attacked,
January-September 1984

	Total	US Official	US Military	Private Corporation	Private Citizen
Europe	7	4	2	1	
Middle East	13	5	3	1	4
Central America	5	1	1	1	2
South America	25	7		18	
Africa	8			3	5
Asia	5	2			3
North America	1			1	
Worldwide	64	19	6	25	14

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Activities of Groups and Responses by Governments

5. Increased terrorism against US interests in the *Middle East* was a predictable response by various opponents of US policy in Lebanon and on the Arab-Israeli dispute. The increase was facilitated by the nearly total breakdown of local security in Beirut, the large number of Americans present in the Multinational Force (MNF) until March 1984, and the existence of a number of Iranian-backed terrorist groups trying to eliminate US influence in Lebanon and drive out all Americans. We believe radical Shia groups have been responsible for nearly all anti-US violence in Lebanon in 1983 and 1984. Iran has inspired and in some cases directed these groups, and Syria probably provided them with some support until the withdrawal of the MNF in March 1984. Continuing Syrian acquiescence in the presence of members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in Lebanon after that date has allowed additional attacks to occur, including the vehicle bombing of the US Embassy Annex in East Beirut in September 1984. Several reports of varying reliability have suggested that radical Palestinian groups may be surveilling US facilities and persons, but to our knowledge only the Syrian-backed Abu Nidal Group (also known as the Black June Organization) has conducted significant anti-US attacks in 1983-84. This group set off or attempted to set off three or four bombs near US facilities in Jordan between November 1983 and August 1984.

6. The apparent main reasons for the drop in terrorist activity against Americans in *Western Europe* have been:

- The failure of the campaign against INF deployments to take on the scope or violent orientation

that might have encouraged terrorists and provided them with an environment more conducive to their activity.

- The continued success of several West European governments in arresting terrorists and suppressing their activity

7. In 1983, as in the year before, the most active terrorists in Western Europe, including those who attacked US interests, were mainly members of small, autonomous organizations who were interested mostly in scoring quick propaganda victories with homemade bombs. (See table 4.) These groups were less active than in 1982, however, primarily because West European governments were more successful in combating them than we had anticipated in writing last year's Memorandum to Holders. Particularly in West Germany and Italy, the governments surrounded anti-INF demonstrations with high levels of security, which prevented terrorists from taking advantage of them. In addition, these governments used information gleaned from earlier arrests and from their increasing understanding of the ways terrorists operate to make new arrests and to disrupt, at least temporarily, efforts by terrorist groups to recover from previous counterterrorist successes. The Spanish, French, Austrian, and Turkish Governments also scored individual counterterrorist successes. Moreover, cooperation increased among a number of West European governments against cross-border activity or the use of another country's territory for safehaven.

8. Despite the overall success of government counterterrorist programs, one potentially worrisome development in Western Europe is the fact that such hardcore, dedicated terrorist groups as the Red Army Faction (RAF) in West Germany and the Red Brigades

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Table 4
Significant Anti-US Terrorist
Incidents: Selected Groups ^a

	Number of Incidents ^b			
	1981	1982	1983	Jan-Sep 1984
West Germany				
Red Army Faction (RAF)	2	2		
RAF Sympathizers	2	3	1	
Revolutionary Cells (RZ)		8		
Indeterminate Leftists				2
Anti-Nuclear Demonstrators			2	
Greece				
Popular Revolutionary Struggle (ELA)	1	3		
17 November Organization			1	1
Italy				
Red Brigades	1			1
France				
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF)	1	1	1	1
Spain				
Iraultza			2	1
Lebanon				
Islamic Amal		1	1	1
Islamic Jihad Organization			3	6
Other Radical Shias				3
Kuwait				
Iraqi Dawa Party			3	
Palestinian				
Abu Nidal Group (formerly Black June Organization)			2	3
El Salvador				
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), Popular Liberation Forces (FPL)	1		2	1
Other Member Groups	3			1
Indeterminate Leftists	4	1	1	1
Colombia				
Army of National Liberation (ELN)			6	4
Movement of April 19th (M-19)	1	1		
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)			2	8
Peru				
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)			2	3
Tupac Amaru				2

^a Responsibility for terrorist incidents has been attributed on the basis of credible claims or other available evidence.

^b Because data may not be complete, all numbers are approximate

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in Italy have shown new signs of life, as we predicted last year. In February 1984, for example, Leamon R. Hunt, the American civilian head of the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers, was assassinated in Rome by a wing of the Red Brigades. Although massive arrests and seizures of weapons and equipment by the Italian authorities in 1982 and 1983 clearly have diminished the size and capabilities of this group, this assassination, Rome's failure thus far to find key figures involved in this attack, and other reporting on its efforts to reorganize indicate that the Red Brigades group remains a force to be reckoned with. The murder of Hunt and an examination of captured internal Red Brigades documents also show that the group intends to continue to pursue "international" targets, such as NATO installations, even though its main focus probably remains on attacking domestic political and economic targets.

9 The RAF in West Germany has also demonstrated strong recuperative powers. Recent arrests of seven RAF members, three of whom had not been so identified previously, and the discovery that they possessed detailed plans and casing reports of various NATO and US military installations indicate that the group is still active and extremely dangerous. Even though the RAF probably has fewer than two dozen members, the bombings and assassinations they planned would not have required a large number of participants.

10 The West European government that has shown the least zeal in combating terrorism directed at foreigners is that of Greece. Partly for this reason, that country has continued to serve as a haven and an operating ground for foreign-based terrorists. Under the Papandreou government, sympathy for leftist causes, tolerance of leftist extremists, and strident anti-American rhetoric also have created an inviting environment for attacks on Americans by Greek terrorists. The most alarming of such attacks were two assaults by the Revolutionary Organization of 17 November group, the organization that assassinated CIA Station Chief Richard Welch in 1975 but which had not attacked Americans since then. The 17 November organization killed a US Navy captain in November 1983, seriously wounded a US Army sergeant in April 1984, and has pledged to continue its attacks in opposition to the US presence in Greece.

11 Terrorism against Americans in *Central America* was at a low ebb in 1983 and has remained low so far in 1984, despite reports that various insurgent groups continue to plot anti-US acts. We believe this is primarily because the guerrillas in El Salvador have

continued to focus on domestic targets, rather than undertaking a terrorist campaign against US interests as we had thought they might. In addition, local security services in all Central American countries have scored a number of successes against insurgents, thereby diminishing local terrorist capabilities. In Honduras, where the American presence is the largest in the area because of US military training activities, the security services have demonstrated particular competence, especially against the main potential terrorist threats there, the Cinchoneros and the Popular Revolutionary Forces-Lorenzo Zelaya (FPR-LZ).

12 In *South America*, terrorism against Americans rose, taking the form primarily of kidnappings and bombings in Colombia and small bombings early this year in Chile. The main perpetrators in Colombia have been several guerrilla groups, especially the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Army of National Liberation (ELN), which regularly use terrorist tactics. In recent months, the Colombian Government has succeeded in negotiating cease-fire agreements with most of the groups, with the notable exception of the ELN. This has not yet dampened the terrorist threat to Americans and others, however, because some of the bombings have been carried out by a dissident faction of the FARC as an internal protest *against* the willingness of the main part of FARC to suspend guerrilla operations. The bombings in Chile are part of a wave of terrorist violence by several groups of leftist revolutionaries, including a new faction directed by the Communist Party. The Chilean Government has reacted by adopting a number of stringent antiterrorist measures. Some anti-US terrorism has also occurred in Peru by narcotics traffickers against American-sponsored drug eradication programs and by the newly formed terrorist group, Tupac Amaru.

State Support for Terrorism

13 The roster of those governments that, directly or indirectly, support or use terrorism as a foreign policy tool remains unchanged. Iran, Syria, and Libya head the list, as they did last year. Iranian involvement with international terrorism is particularly worrisome, because it has risen dramatically in the last two years. Iranian operatives have gained considerable experience in organizing support elements and in planning and carrying out terrorist operations in foreign countries, particularly in the Middle East and Western Europe. In many cases, Iran uses Revolutionary Guard members to support foreign terrorist surrogates acting on Iran's behalf. The Department of Investigations

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and Studies of the Foreign Ministry also provides support and sometimes controls terrorist operations directly. In addition to broad Iranian Government involvement in radical Shia terrorism in Lebanon, Iranian embassies in Paris, Vienna, Damascus, and Kuwait and the consulate in Karachi at one time or another have been important centers for support of terrorist activities. In addition to attacks against US targets, Israeli, Lebanese, Iraqi, moderate Arab, and French interests have also been attacked in Lebanon, Iraq, the Persian Gulf, and Western Europe by radical Shias under the direction of the Iranians. We have good information indicating that Iranian Government agents recruit widely in Muslim communities through indigenous Shia organizations and Islamic cultural centers, sending the recruits to Iran for politico-religious indoctrination, basic military training, and, for a carefully screened group, specialized guerrilla and terrorist training. Training of foreign recruits is conducted by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and is funded partly out of both Ayatollah Khomeini's office and that of his heir apparent, Ayatollah Montazeri.

14 *Syria* actively supported terrorist attacks against the United States in Lebanon during 1983 and the early part of 1984 until US Marines withdrew. In addition to suspected involvement in the attack against the US Embassy in Beirut in April 1983, there is evidence that Syria cooperated with Iranian-backed terrorists who attacked US targets in Lebanon before and after the October 1983 bombing of the US Marine barracks. In Jordan the Syrian Government instigated and assisted the bombing attacks by the non-PLO Abu Nidal Group against the home of a US official in Amman in November 1983 and the Intercontinental Hotel there in March 1984, in which two Americans were wounded in what may have been an anti-British attack. Besides their use of the Abu Nidal Group, the Syrians have employed or are in a position to employ a number of other groups for terrorist attacks on their enemies, including four elements of the PLO. Saiqa, the Fatah rebels, the Palestinian Struggle Front, and the PFLP-GC (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command). Only Saiqa may have attacked US interests in this period by bombing an unoccupied classroom at American University in Beirut, but all the groups have some capability to do so, some of them (such as the PFLP-GC) in countries outside the Middle East.

15 *Libya's* terrorist activity surged in 1984, but so far no attacks attributable to Tripoli have occurred against US targets. Libyan terrorism has focused primarily on anti-Qadhafi exiles residing in Western

Europe and the Middle East and, secondarily, against France and other nations opposing Libya in Chad and Sudan. We believe Americans have not been targeted directly by Qadhafi, despite his strident anti-American rhetoric, because his assets seem generally involved in the antidissident campaign, and because he may fear the US response should such attacks occur. Nevertheless, reports indicate that Libya has directed its surrogates in Chad and Sudan to attack US targets, so far unsuccessfully. Libya's ties with these and other terrorist groups, such as the PFLP-GC, place official US personnel and facilities located in Western Europe, the Middle East, and Africa at some risk, however, particularly if Qadhafi becomes convinced that US support for his opponents is threatening the existence of his regime.

16. *Soviet, East European, Cuban, and Nicaraguan* attitudes and activities with regard to revolutionary violence and terrorism remain unchanged. They continue to provide governments and organizations that use terrorist tactics with funds, weapons, supplies, and training. Bulgarian gray-market sales of weapons that end up in terrorist hands are particularly noteworthy in this regard. The anti-American rhetoric of these governments also helps stir sentiment against the United States, which helps create a fertile environment for anti-US terrorism in such areas as the Middle East. In the case of Cuba, besides its support for groups that conduct terrorism in Central America, it is also stimulating such groups in South America. Cuban pressure, for example, was probably the deciding factor that led leaders of the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) recently to decide to reinitiate armed activities in Chile. The MIR was one of the most active terrorist groups in Chile in the past. Cuba may also be backing the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, a shadowy group that has claimed responsibility for numerous recent bombings in Santiago. Cuban officials have also been implicated in facilitating the efforts of the Colombian FARC to sell narcotics for money with which they purchase weapons and in helping to move those weapons to Colombia.

Anti-US Terrorist Threats in the Period Ahead

17 Looking at the prospects for anti-US terrorism over the next year, as detailed in the sections that follow, we conclude that the number of attacks likely to be directed against Americans will remain at about the same overall level as that experienced in 1981-83, although our confidence in this judgment is not high because terrorism trends are extremely difficult to

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predict. Three analytical problems greatly complicate forecasting on this subject:

- Terrorism is in part a reactive phenomenon. That is, surges in the level of terrorist effort against the United States in any area are often closely related to terrorists' perceptions that the United States has taken policy initiatives they consider inimical to their cause or has taken an action, such as the deployment of US forces, that gives them an unusual opportunity for publicity or an expanded US target to attack.
- There is a large element of luck involved as to whether a government counterterrorist program can prevent any particular terrorist act. Terrorist groups are usually small, have very limited capabilities, and can be drastically affected by a single government counterterrorist success. Moreover, the limited resources of terrorists may become absorbed in attacking the interests of some states other than the United States, as has happened to the French in the Middle East. In this regard, it is worth noting that there are no terrorist groups (with the possible exception of the LARF in France) that conduct the majority of their attacks against Americans. Nonetheless, it takes only a few dedicated people and a small amount of explosives or arms to mount a potentially high-impact attack.
- The number of casualties that any particular terrorist attack may cause also is subject to a large element of chance. Because perceptions of how significant the terrorist threat is at any moment frequently turn on the number of dead and wounded caused by a single attack rather than the trend in number and frequency of attacks, this also complicates forecasting.

18. These caveats notwithstanding, we estimate that the most dangerous area for Americans over the next year, with regard to the deadliness of terrorist attacks, will remain the Middle East. This judgment is based on the intense anti-American sentiments there, the fanaticism, and the willingness of many Middle Eastern terrorists to accept high personal risk, including participation in suicide attacks. Moreover, the increasing spillover of Middle East terrorism into Western Europe and Africa could pose an expanded threat to the lives of Americans in these regions as well.

19. The number of attacks against US interests in Western Europe has declined since 1982, and we doubt that a sharp increase will occur in the next year. We believe, however, that some of the more deadly

terrorist groups there will continue to mount occasional assassination attempts and lethal bombings against Americans in several of these countries. We are also concerned that some members of the radical fringe of the peace movement may turn to terrorist violence in frustration as INF deployments advance.

20. In our estimation, terrorism against the United States in Central America is likely to remain at a fairly low level, at least through the end of 1984. We believe the revolutionaries there will concentrate their resources mostly on insurgency against domestic targets, and their primary foreign backers—Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Nicaragua—may not want to risk precipitating greater US intervention in the area.

21. The number of terrorist attacks against US targets in South America is likely to remain at a high level, especially in Colombia, and could even grow in the next year. The level of political volatility is increasing in such countries as Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and American interests might be struck more frequently as part of a general rise in violence. Generally, these attacks probably will continue to be nonlethal bombings of property, particularly the premises of US businesses.

22. Americans will occasionally be the targets or, perhaps more often, incidental victims of terrorist violence in Africa and South Asia. Direct attacks on US personnel, property, and interests will be less frequent there than in other regions, but we believe the threat to Americans in southern Africa, Sudan, and Sri Lanka is increasing as domestic violence in these areas grows.

Middle East

23. The main threat to US persons and facilities will continue to come from Iranian-sponsored groups, such as the Islamic Amal in Lebanon and the Dawa Party, a group with members in several Middle East nations. The Iraqi Dawa Party, which was responsible for the bombing of the US Embassy in Kuwait in December 1983, and the Hizballah in Lebanon, which almost certainly carried out the September bombing of the US Embassy Annex in East Beirut, are especially dangerous. The United States will remain at greatest risk in Lebanon, but its interests in the Persian Gulf face a gradually rising danger from local Shias trained or inspired by Tehran, as long as radicals remain influential in Iran. The threat to US facilities in several Persian Gulf nations may become especially intense if Iraq carries out major attacks on Iran's oil facilities or cities. More generally, Iranian hostility toward the

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United States will persist as long as Tehran sees its goal of installing Islamic governments throughout the Muslim world impeded primarily by the influence and presence of the United States.

24. Syrian Government motivation to encourage or sponsor terrorist attacks against US interests in Lebanon dropped when the US contingent of the Multinational Force was withdrawn from Lebanon in March 1984 and the 17 May accord between Israel and Lebanon was abrogated. For example, of the 24 significant attacks against US interests in Lebanon in the 33-month period between January 1982 and September 1984, 17 occurred during the eight months the US Marine force was in the country. Syria remains willing to use terrorist violence as a tool of state policy, but we believe it will not encourage attacks on American targets in Lebanon as long as leaders in Damascus believe Syrian national interests are protected in whatever political arrangements evolve in that country. Moreover, some evidence suggests Syria has imposed some constraints on Iranian-backed terrorism in Lebanon that threatens Damascus's ability to control events there. We are concerned, however, that Syria will continue to direct its surrogates to attack targets in Jordan, including US facilities, especially after Amman's sudden renewal of diplomatic relations with Egypt. A factor that may weaken Syria's terrorist capability in Jordan is the splintering of its major surrogate, the Abu Nidal Group, due to the incapacitating illness or death of its leader. We believe, however, that at least part of the group will continue to operate at the behest of Syrian intelligence and that such other groups as Saiqa or the PFLP-GC are potentially available to pick up the slack.

25. Radical groups within the Palestine Liberation Organization, such as Saiqa and the PFLP, generally continue to observe the 1974 PLO ban on terrorism outside Israel and the occupied territories. In the past, we believed that Chairman Arafat might lift this ban if necessary to retain control of the PLO. This did not happen in 1983 when his control was severely challenged, however, and this issue may be less relevant to the leadership struggle than we once thought. We therefore judge the probability of PLO terrorism against the United States to be low in the short term, but the leadership struggle is not yet over. Some reporting indicates more breakaway factions may be plotting a return to international terrorism, including attacks on US targets. Most of the energies of these groups, however, will probably continue to be absorbed over the next year by their internecine struggle for influence within the PLO, and in increasing

attacks against their primary enemy, Israel. Outside the PLO, the 15 May Organization may pose some danger to US interests. In December 1983 and again in early 1984, it tried unsuccessfully to place suitcase bombs on airlines serving Israel, and it continues to pose a threat to international aviation, as well as to Israeli and Jewish interests worldwide.

26. We will probably continue to receive alarming reports about Libyan intentions to attack US targets—especially diplomats and diplomatic facilities—during the next year, but it is much more likely that the main direct Libyan terrorist threat will continue to be against anti-Qadhafi dissidents and Libya's immediate opponents in Africa and the Middle East. Qadhafi continues to dispatch agents to assassinate dissident Libyans, particularly in Western Europe. Attacks may also be attempted on dissidents in the United States, although the more lax security conditions in countries such as Greece probably are more conducive to Qadhafi's assassination attempts. Tripoli's efforts to encourage anti-US attacks by non-Libyan groups, although unsuccessful up to now, also remain of concern.

Western Europe

27. US interests face two kinds of terrorist threats in Western Europe over the next year. The most frequent type of attack almost certainly will continue to be bombings of property for propaganda purposes with no apparent intent to harm persons. At this point, we do not forecast any significant rise in the number of such terrorist incidents, because we do not anticipate any sharp change in the perceptions of radical leftists in Western Europe of their political situation, or of US or Allied policies. Without such a change we doubt that anti-US terrorist attacks of this kind will rise substantially or suddenly. With such a change, they are almost certain to increase, although the counterterrorist capabilities of most West European governments are improving steadily enough possibly to prevent attacks of this kind from reaching the proportions they did in 1982.

28. The other kind of terrorist threat is the more carefully planned, sophisticated attack that is intended to be lethal, of the kind mounted in the past by the RAF in West Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy, the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF) in France, and the 17 November group in Greece. We believe recent government successes against the RAF will keep it off balance for the next several months; however, the extent of its current ability to reorganize is unknown and the group may still be capable of

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mounting isolated, although spectacular, operations against US targets. Clearly, both the RAF and the Red Brigades have indicated they fully intend to include US and NATO targets in future operations, and there is no reason to think their targeting will change. Nonetheless, both the West German and Italian Governments have demonstrated in the last two years good capabilities against these two groups, so there is at least some possibility that they will be able to interrupt any new attempts.

29. The LARF and 17 November represent considerably more immediate threats. French security officials know very little about the membership or goals of LARF and have had little success in countering it. LARF claimed credit for the attempted assassination of the US Consul General in Strasbourg in March, and it is responsible for three other attempted or successful assassinations of US officials in 1981 and 1982. There is a strong possibility that it will try again in the next 12 months. The 17 November Organization is also likely to continue to attack Americans, as it pledged to do in a recent communique. No arrests have been made in connection with its previous attacks, and there are no indications that the Greek Government is making any progress in its investigation of this group. In Turkey the recent increase in terrorist attacks against local targets suggests that the threat to Americans—particularly US military—may also grow there in the period ahead.

Central America

30. Even though the current level of terrorism against Americans in this region is quite low and probably will not rise substantially, the situations in Honduras and El Salvador bear watching. The threat in Honduras is magnified by the large US presence there and the consequent large number of targets available. So far, Honduran security forces have done a good job of suppressing the two main Honduran groups that have terrorist inclinations, and we see no signs the guerrillas are developing the capability for major actions. Nonetheless, we expect that Cuba and Nicaragua will continue to support various insurgent groups in Central America and will continue to encourage them to undertake violent activity. In El Salvador the threat comes from both the extreme left and the extreme right. It is possible that some guerrilla factions that oppose the recently announced negotiations with the Duarte administration might, in the near future, resort to sporadic urban terrorism in an effort to undermine those talks. A greater risk of a serious rise in terrorism, however, would be created by

a more widespread guerrilla decision to turn to urban terrorism in the event that the negotiations break down and the guerrillas see themselves as unable to regain the initiative in the countryside. This kind of development, however, is unlikely to occur before the opening months of 1985 at the earliest. The extreme right might also resort to terrorist tactics in an effort to undermine US support for the Duarte administration, particularly if government negotiations with the guerrillas seem to be succeeding.

South America

31. Over the next 12 months or so, US interests in South America will face their greatest threat in Colombia—primarily from those dissident guerrilla factions that oppose their groups' participation in peace negotiations with the government and from narcotics traffickers who are incensed at US efforts to persuade the Colombian Government to crack down on their activities. This latter danger also exists in Peru. The level of domestic violence in Chile, Ecuador, and Bolivia may also rise, but the direct threat to US interests will probably remain fairly low. Terrorist groups there show little inclination to expand their attacks on US targets beyond infrequent harassment bombings that are directed against businesses or diplomatic facilities and which cause only minor damage. US personnel, however, may be in increasing danger of finding themselves in the wrong place at the wrong time, thereby becoming incidental victims of terrorist violence.

In the United States

32. The number of successful foreign terrorist attacks in the United States remains relatively low compared with those in other regions of the world, and we see little reason for it to rise over the next year or so. In part, this is due to significant investigative and prosecutive successes by US security organizations in the last two years. The incarceration of the key leaders of several groups and tight security at such events as the Los Angeles Olympics have contributed to a situation in which there was only one attack in the United States by an international terrorist group in 1983—against a foreign national—and none thus far in 1984. Nonetheless, the potential for terrorist violence in the United States should not be underestimated. Because of its size, porous borders, open society, and widespread involvement in global political matters, the United States remains vulnerable to terrorist operations. Potential terrorist support networks are in place, and certain groups have the motivation to

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commit terrorist acts here—either because they oppose US foreign policy or because they hate particular ethnic groups resident in the United States.

33. The international groups and individuals most likely to initiate terrorist attacks in this country are those with strong ties to major state supporters of terrorism—especially Iran and Libya—and those separatist/irredentist groups with large ethnic groups resident in the United States—primarily the Armenians, Palestinians, and Cubans. Of those groups associated with states that use terrorist tactics, Iranians are present in the United States in considerable numbers, often in student status, and pose the greatest potential threat. While their past activities have been largely restricted to internecine conflicts between pro- and anti-Khomeini factions, we have some concern that an Iranian terrorist threat could develop under the right circumstances. The Islamic Society, a student group with chapters throughout the country, provides an infrastructure that could be used in terrorist acts if Iranian leaders so chose. To date, Iran has elected to attack the United States in other areas of the world, and we believe that will continue to be Tehran's preference because anti-US attacks elsewhere are probably easier. Nevertheless, future events in the Middle East could change these calculations.

34. Libyans are also present in the United States in large numbers and, as with the Iranians, often as students. Libya has no embassy here from which to coordinate terrorist activity, but it does maintain a student committee in McLean, Virginia, that appears to monitor and direct the Libyan student population in this country. While Libyan-sponsored terrorism in the United States has been restricted to retaliating against Libyan dissidents, it is possible that Qadhafi could direct his assets to attack US domestic interests if he felt the existence of his regime was threatened by the United States or had some other reason for seeking vengeance against Americans.

35. Cuba supports terrorist activity in other regions, but we believe that under current conditions Castro will be wary of sponsoring or initiating anti-American

terrorism in the continental United States. He does not want to alienate US public opinion, and he is concerned over what he perceives as the Reagan administration's willingness—as demonstrated in Grenada—to respond with direct action to any perceived aggression by the Cubans. We believe this policy is likely to change, however, if Castro concludes Cuba really is under imminent danger of attack by the United States. Cuba is in regular contact with Puerto Rican terrorists—the Puerto Rican Socialist Party maintains an office in Havana—and would expect them to conduct attacks inside the United States as part of a larger Cuban effort to stimulate a worldwide wave of anti-US violence to prevent or to retaliate for a US attack on Cuba.

36. With regard to separatist/irredentist ethnic groups, the major Armenian terrorist groups—the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG)—present the greatest danger. The ASALA organization in the United States currently suffers from fragmentation within its ranks over ideology and is distrusted by elements abroad because of fears that it has been severely penetrated. ASALA, however, may retain the capability to conduct attacks. The JCAG continues to pose a serious threat to Turkish targets in the United States and can be expected to recommence activities after a brief hiatus during the trial in Los Angeles of five members. These individuals were convicted in October 1984, thus removing any disincentive to action that may have existed because of a desire not to influence adversely the trial's outcome. At present, neither ASALA nor JCAG poses a serious direct threat to non-Turkish targets in the United States, although ASALA's bombing attacks in the past have been indiscriminate enough to harm bystanders. The Palestinian groups in the United States have generally chosen to avoid violence so as not to jeopardize their efforts to establish a political base of support here. Moreover, these groups—like their counterparts abroad—are preoccupied with an internal power struggle.

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